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Recent years have seen great interest in the suggestion that between-group aggression and within-group
altruism have coevolved. However, these efforts have neglected the possibility that warfare – via its impact
on demography – might influence human social behaviours more widely, not just those directly connected
to success in war. Moreover, the potential for sex differences in the demography of warfare to translate
into sex differences in social behaviour more generally has remained unexplored. Here, we develop a
kin-selection model of altruism performed by men and women for the benefit of their groupmates in
a population experiencing intergroup conflict. We find that warfare can promote altruistic, helping beha-
viours as the additional reproductive opportunities winners obtain in defeated groups decrease harmful
competition between kin. Furthermore, we find that sex can be a crucial modulator of altruism, with
there being a tendency for the sex that competes more intensely with relatives to behave more altruistically
and for the sex that competes more intensely with non-relatives in defeated groups to receive more altru-
ism. In addition, there is also a tendency for the less-dispersing sex to both give and receive more altruism.
We discuss implications for our understanding of observed sex differences in cooperation in human
societies.
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Media summary: Recent research has suggested that altruism and warfare might have evolved
together. However, by focusing only on behaviours that improve success in battle, this work has
ignored the potential for warfare to influence altruism more widely – and has also neglected the pos-
sible role of sex differences in this context. We developed a mathematical evolutionary model to
explore these questions. We found that men, the sex that historically participated in war and also
migrated less often, would have tended to be more altruistic and also receive more help from other
men – forming ‘boys’ clubs’. Depending on the nature of warfare and migration, other systems are
also possible, including societies where it is mainly men who help women or even ‘girls’ clubs’.
Introduction
The last decade has seen considerable multidisciplinary interest in understanding the potential evolu-
tionary links between warfare and the high levels of altruism observed in human societies (Bauer et al.
2016; Rusch 2014; Rusch et al. 2016; Turchin 2015). Darwin (1871) was the first to explore this pos-
sibility, suggesting that intergroup conflict might have generated selection for altruism, on account of
more cooperative groups being more successful in warfare. Recently, this idea has been modelled
mathematically by Choi and Bowles (2007), who showed that within-group altruism and between-
group hostility could have coevolved, leading to an intersection of these two behaviours that has
been termed ‘parochial altruism’ (see also Bowles 2006, 2009; Garcia and van der Bergh 2011).
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Empirical evidence for the co-occurrence of these behaviours in both small-scale and industrialised
societies is mixed and still subject to investigation (Doğan et al. 2018; Gneezy and Fessler, 2011;
Mathew and Boyd 2011; Romano et al. 2017; Schaub 2017; Silva and Mace 2014; also reviewed in
Rusch 2014; Rusch et al. 2016).
However, the possibility that warfare, through its effect on demography, might shape human social
behaviours more widely than just those connected with success in war has been largely neglected.
Warfare can affect with whom individuals mate and whether or not they reproduce at all
(Glowacki et al. 2017), thus possibly altering patterns of relatedness and competition. Patterns of
relatedness and competition, in turn, are known to modulate incentives to perform social behaviours
(Frank 1998) and, in this way, warfare demographies could influence other forms of within-group
altruism – not just those that result in greater success in battle and that have been the focus of math-
ematical analyses so far (also Bowles 2006, 2009; Choi and Bowles 2007; Garcia and van der Bergh
2011; Lehmann and Feldman 2008; Micheletti et al. 2017, 2018). Moreover, incentives to behave altru-
istically could vary in sex-specific ways, as warfare might affect the demography of the two sexes
differently – for example through sex-biased dispersal. While sex has been suggested to modulate
behaviours in the context of intergroup conflict in both empirical (Johnson et al. 2006; van Vugt et
al. 2006; McDonald et al. 2012; van Vugt 2009) and theoretical studies (Micheletti et al. 2017,
2018), the role of sex-biased demographies in this respect has not been explored formally.
Furthermore, the intensity of altruistic behaviours might depend on the sex of the recipient of altru-
ism, as well as on the sex of the altruist – that is, the sex of both interactants may determine behav-
ioural patterns. Since the evolutionary interests of men and women often diverge and the two sexes
play different roles in social groups (Low 2015), elucidating the possible demographic drivers of sex-
specific altruism is key to illuminate human sociality.
Here, we develop a kin-selection model to assess the scope for the demography of warfare – in
particular, pre-war dispersal and the movements of individuals between groups resulting from victory
or defeat in war – to influence overall levels of sex-specific, within-group altruism. We perform two
analyses to generate comparative predictions as to which sex is favoured by natural selection to be
more altruistic and which sex is favoured to receive more altruism under different demographic con-
ditions. We adopt a behavioural ecological approach to human behaviour (Nettle et al. 2013), focusing
on the inclusive fitness effects of acting altruistically and assuming – for the purposes of analysis – that
these behaviours are controlled genetically. We define altruism broadly as any behaviour that reduces
the competitiveness for reproductive opportunities of the actor, but increases the competitiveness of
the recipient (Hamilton 1964; West et al. 2007). Such altruism may benefit the whole group – for
example, remaining vigilant at night to alert groupmates of predatory threats, contributing to the
construction of public goods – or be aimed at one or more individuals – for example, helping with
foraging or cultivation work, or sharing fitness-enhancing resources, such as food, tools and shelter.
By focusing on overall levels of altruism, our analysis can illuminate the role of sex and demography in
generating variation in all of these cases. In order to assess the effects of warfare on social behaviours
not directly related to warfare itself, we assume that the altruistic behaviours under consideration do
not increase the group’s probability of engaging in or winning confrontations with other groups.
Methods
We employ a two-sex kin-selection model of between-group conflict, adapting and expanding a pre-
viously developed framework (Lehmann and Feldman 2008; Micheletti et al. 2017, 2018) to consider
the evolution of altruism. We perform two analyses. In the first analysis, we explore which sex is
favoured to be more altruistic by considering altruism, performed by either men or women, that ben-
efits the group as whole. In the second analysis we investigate which sex altruism should be aimed
towards, by considering the evolution of four altruistic behaviours: male-to-male altruism,
male-to-female altruism, female-to-male altruism and female-to-female altruism. We determine
how selection acts on each of these six altruistic traits by conducting kin-selection analyses
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(Hamilton 1964; Maynard Smith 1964; Taylor 1996; Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1997, 1998;
Rousset 2004; Taylor et al. 2007) (see Supporting Information for full details).
Model assumptions
Following Lehmann and Feldman (2008) and Micheletti et al. (2017, 2018), we consider an infinitely
large population subdivided into an infinite number of groups, each with finite numbers Ni of adults
of sex i ∈ {m,f} where m denotes male and f denotes female, and we consider that all groups are
equally distant from each other (assumptions shared with Wright’s (1931) infinite island model).
These are simplifying assumptions that abstract away from some of the complexity that likely
characterised ancestral human populations living a hunter-gather lifestyle in the Pleistocene and
many small-scale societies until recent times. For example, distance might have influenced how
often groups engaged in war or maintained peaceful relations, and conflicts might have been
more frequent or intense between groups from different ethnolinguistic communities (Fry 2013).
However, these assumptions afford mathematical tractability (Servedio et al. 2014) and allow the
derivation of analytical results regarding the selective pressures surrounding intergroup warfare,
as demonstrated by previous work adopting them (Lehmann and Feldman 2008; Micheletti et al.
2017, 2018).
Life cycle
At the beginning of the life cycle, the Nf women and Nm men in each group mate in a regime of abso-
lute promiscuity and each woman produces a large number Kf of daughters and a large number Km of
sons who mature to become young adults (for simplicity and following Lehmann and Feldman
(2008) and Micheletti et al. (2017, 2018) we assume non-overlapping generations, so that only
young adults, hereafter ‘individuals’, can disperse, be altruistic and then reproduce). Each sex-i indi-
vidual may then disperse to a randomly chosen group with sex-specific probability mi. After the dis-
persal phase, individuals have the opportunity to be altruistic towards their groupmates. In the first
analysis, we consider altruism xi that is performed by sex i and that benefits both male and female
groupmates indiscriminately. In the second analysis, we consider altruism xij that is performed by
sex i and that is aimed exclusively towards groupmates of sex j – where i, j ∈ {m,f}. The war
phase follows, with each post-dispersal group having the chance to attack another randomly chosen
group with probability a and be attacked by a third group – again randomly selected – with the same
probability a, and with attackers winning the war with probability ω. This is followed by density-
dependent regulation, consisting of scramble competition among same-sex competitors for the Ni
sex-i reproductive spots in each group, with different individuals having potentially different com-
petitiveness weightings, but all successful breeders having the same fertility (i.e. no reproductive
skew among breeders). Notice that results for reproductive skew could be recovered by substituting
Ni with the appropriate number of ‘effective’ equal-fertility breeders, and our results hold in this
case (see Supporting Information).
In groups that are not attacked or that are attacked and successfully defend themselves, sex-i
individuals compete only with sex-i groupmates and have competitiveness ti, which is termed the
individual’s intrinsic competitiveness. In groups that are attacked and are defeated by their attackers,
sex-i individuals instead compete for reproductive opportunities in their group with both sex-i
groupmates and with their sex-i attackers, with the conquered group’s sex-i individuals having
competitiveness for reproductive opportunities (1 – σi) ti and the conquering group’s sex-i individuals
having competitiveness σi ti. The competitiveness modifier σi is equal to the fraction of sex-i repro-
ductive opportunities in a conquered group seized by conquering sex-i individuals and thus modulates
the additional reproductive opportunities afforded by warfare to individuals from victorious groups.
Notice that, while the model allows for defeated individuals to be forcefully relocated to the victorious
group by their conquerors, it does not allow them to have reproductive success in these groups.
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Altruism by men or women towards all groupmates indiscriminately
In the first analysis, the intrinsic competitiveness ti of a sex-i individual is modulated by the altruism xi
performed by that sex-i individual towards male and female groupmates indiscriminately, by the
altruism xi′ the sex-i individual receives from other sex-i individuals, and by the altruism xj′ the
sex-i individual receives from sex-j individuals in their group, such that −(∂ti/∂xi)/ti = ci is
the competitive cost of being altruistic towards groupmates incurred by the sex-i individual, and
∂ti/∂x′i
( )
/ti = ∂ti/∂x′j
( )
/ti = bi is the marginal increase in competitiveness enjoyed by the sex-i
individual as a result of altruism received from groupmates of either sex i or sex j.
Altruism by men or women towards male or female groupmates exclusively
In the second analysis, the intrinsic competitiveness ti of a sex-i individual is modulated by the altru-
ism xii performed by that sex-i individual towards other sex-i individuals, by the altruism xij per-
formed by that sex-i individual towards sex-j individuals, by the altruism xii′ the sex-i individual
receives from other sex-i individuals, and by the altruism xji′ the sex-i individual receives from
sex-j individuals in their group, such that − ∂ti/∂xii
( )
/ti = cii is the competitive cost of being altruistic
towards sex-i groupmates incurred by the sex-i individual, −(∂ti/∂xij)/ti = cij is the competitive cost
of being altruistic towards sex-j groupmates incurred by the sex-i individual, (∂ti/∂x′ii) /ti = bii is the
marginal increase in competitiveness enjoyed by the sex-i individual as a result of altruism received
from sex-i groupmates, and (∂ti/∂x′ji) /ti = (∂tj/∂x′ij) /tj = bij is the marginal increase in competitive-
ness enjoyed by the sex-i individual as a result of altruism received from sex-j groupmates.
Results
We first investigate which sex is favoured to perform more altruism, focusing on altruistic behaviours
that are uniformly beneficial for the group, that is they are not targeted towards a specific sex of group-
mates. Examples of such behaviours include staying on guard to alert groupmates about predators or
sharing resources equally among all individuals in the group. Analysing the model, we find that nat-
ural selection – including both direct and indirect (i.e. kin selection) effects (Hamilton 1964; Maynard
Smith 1964) – favours an individual of sex i ∈ {m,f} to increase altruism that benefits male and female
groupmates indiscriminately when:
− ci + aicirii + bi 12 rim +
1
2
rif
( )
− bi 12amrim +
1
2
af rif
( )
. 0, (1)
where ci is the marginal cost incurred by the sex-i individual on account of their altruism towards their
groupmates; bi is the marginal benefit enjoyed by the recipient of the altruistic act performed by the
sex-i individual; rij = (1 – mi)(1 – mj)rx is the genetic relatedness between groupmates of sex i and of
sex j (with i, j ∈ {m,f} and rx being relatedness between individuals born in the same group; see
Supporting Information); and αi = 1 – 2aωMi is the extent to which individuals of sex i compete
for reproductive opportunities with same-sex groupmates – i.e. ‘locally’ – as opposed to same-sex indi-
viduals in other groups – i.e. ‘globally’ (such that αi = 1 is fully local competition and αi = 0 is fully
global competition).
The scale of competition coefficient αi is modulated by a quantity Mi = (1 – σi)σi, which describes
the extent to which reproductive opportunities in a conquered group are obtained by a mixture of indi-
viduals from the winning and the defeated groups (‘admixture’, Micheletti et al. 2017; see also
Methods). For example, consider a case in which warfare is a purely male domain and thus leads
to men from victorious groups reproducing in defeated groups, while women only compete in their
home group (σm > σf = 0). This will result in higher male than female admixture (i.e. male-biased
admixture, Mm > Mf = 0), and thus men will be the more globally competing sex and women the
more locally competing sex (αm < αf = 1). If instead women compete and reproduce in defeated groups
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to some extent, it can be possible for admixture to be female-biased and, consequently, for women to
be competing more globally then men.
The inclusive fitness interpretation of condition (1) is that, by increasing their level of altruism
towards groupmates, an individual of sex i incurs: a direct-fitness cost (first term) owing to a –ci
loss of competitiveness for reproductive opportunities; an indirect-fitness benefit (second term)
owing to a corresponding relaxation of kin competition in their own sex, as ci reproductive opportun-
ities become available to sex-i individuals who are competing kin with probability αi and who are
related to the focal individual by rii; an indirect-fitness benefit (third term) owing to a bi increase
in competitiveness for reproductive opportunities for groupmates who, with probability ½, are men
related to the focal sex-i individual by rim or, with the same probability ½, are women related to
the focal sex-i individual by rif; an indirect-fitness cost (fourth term) owing to a corresponding
increase in kin competition, as fewer reproductive opportunities (–bi) are available for male
groupmates (or female groupmates) who are derived from the same group – and are thus competing
kin – with probabilities αm (or αf) and who are related to the focal individual by rim (or rif ). Note that
condition (1) holds even when individuals gain a direct benefit from performing the behaviour (ci < 0),
in which case this constitutes mutual benefit rather than altruism (West et al. 2007; the results of the
present analysis thus hold for cooperative behaviours in general, i.e. including both altruism and
mutually beneficial cooperation).
Consideration of condition (1) reveals that the demography of warfare can generate incentives for
within-group altruism under broad conditions. Specifically, altruism can be favoured whenever war-
fare exports at least a fraction of male or female competition for reproductive opportunities from win-
ning groups to defeated groups (αm ≠ 1 and/or αf ≠ 1). This ensures that the inclusive fitness benefit
obtained by acting altruistically towards groupmates (third term in condition (1)) is not exactly can-
celled by the associated inclusive fitness cost owing to an increase in kin competition (fourth term), as
would happen in populations with limited dispersal in the absence of a mechanism decoupling these
two effects (Taylor 1992; reviewed in Lehmann and Rousset 2010).
Furthermore, condition (1) can be rearranged into the form ci/bi < Ai, where
Ai =
1
2
rim − amrim( ) + 12 rif − af rif( )
1− airii (2)
is the ‘potential for altruism’ by members of sex i towards their groupmates (cf. Gardner 2010). This
approach separates the cost and benefit functions (ci/bi; left-hand side of the rearranged condition)
from demographic effects on altruism (the ‘potential’ Ai; right-hand side). By analysing potentials
for altruism, we can focus on assessing the effects of sex-specific demography on altruism – the
aim of the present study – independently of the details of the cost and benefits functions.
Consideration of the potential for altruism above (equation 2) reveals two key results regarding
which sex is favoured to be more altruistic. First, all else being equal, the sex that disperses at a
lower rate has a greater potential for altruism than the more dispersing sex (see Figure 1a). For
example, if dispersal is female-biased (mm < mf), we predict that men will be more altruistic than
women (Am > Af), all else being equal. This prediction arises because, since they disperse less, men
are more related to groupmates of either sex than are women (rmm > rmf > rff ) and thus reap greater
benefits from being altruistic. Second, all else being equal, the sex that – as a result of warfare –
competes more locally for reproductive opportunities has a higher potential for altruism towards
their groupmates than the more globally competing sex (see Figure 1b). For example, if men from
winning groups compete in defeated groups more than women – that is, women compete more locally
(αm < αf) – then we predict that women will be more altruistic than men (Am < Af), all else being
equal. This prediction arises because, as women compete with other related women more often
than men, they reap greater benefits by reducing kin competition through altruistic behaviours
than men do (second term in condition 1). In addition, we find that, with increasing values of
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frequency of war (a), levels of potentials for altruism either increase or do not change, but they never
decrease (that is, dAi/da≥ 0).
We have delineated the conditions under which men and women can be favoured to act altruistic-
ally to the benefit of all individuals in their group. We now consider cases in which altruistic
behaviours can be targeted at individuals of exclusively one sex – and ask whether such altruism
should be directed towards male or female groupmates. Analysing the model, we find that natural
selection – including both direct and indirect (i.e. kin selection) effects (Hamilton 1964; Maynard
Smith 1964) – favours an individual of sex i to increase their altruism towards groupmates of sex j
(where i, j ∈ {m,f}) when:
− cij + aicijrii + bijrij − ajbijrij . 0, (3)
where cij is the marginal cost incurred by the sex-i individual on account of their altruism towards
groupmates of sex j and bij is the marginal benefit enjoyed by the sex-j recipient of the altruistic
act performed by the sex-i individual.
Condition (3) can be rearranged into the form cij/bij < Aij, where
Aij =
rij − ajrij
1− airii (4)
is the potential for altruism by members of sex i towards groupmates of sex j. Notice that, if i = j, Aij is
the potential for altruism towards the same sex whereas, if i ≠ j, Aij is the potential for altruism towards
the opposite sex.
Consideration of the potential for altruism immediately above (equation 4) reveals two key results.
First, all else being equal, both sexes have a greater potential for altruism towards the sex that disperses
less (see Figure 2a). For example, in the case of female-biased dispersal (mm < mf), we predict that men
receive more altruism (Amm < Amf and Afm < Aff ), all else being equal. This is because, in this situation,
men are more related to groupmates of both sexes than are women (rmm > rmf > rff, as a result of the
Figure 1. Male and female altruism towards groupmates of either sex. Each pie chart shows potential for altruism by men towards
groupmates (purple) vs potential for altruism by women towards groupmates (brown) and the sum of the two potentials (diameter
of pie chart) – for low and high values of male and female dispersal rates (a), or for low and high values of male and female scale
of competition (b). Other parameter values: (a and b) Nm = Nf = 3, a = 0.5, ω = 0.5; (a) σm = σf = 0.4 leading to Mm =Mf = 0.24 and
αm = αf = 0.88; (b) mm =mf = 0.1, σi = 0.4 leading Mi = 0.24 (for αi = 0.88) and σi = 0.2 leading Mi = 0.16 (for αi = 0.96).
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bias in dispersal) and thus the benefits reaped by actors of both sexes from being altruistic towards
men are higher. Second, both sexes have a higher potential for altruism towards members of the
sex that competes more globally, all else being equal (see Figure 2b). Considering again an example
in which men compete relatively more globally and women relatively more locally (αf > αm), we pre-
dict that men will receive more altruism from groupmates of both sexes (Amf < Amm and Aff < Afm).
This is because, as men compete more often with non-relatives, the indirect cost of increased kin com-
petition is lower when helping them than when helping women, for both sexes (fourth term in con-
dition 3). Notice how, in this example, men competing more globally and women more locally leads to
women helping groupmates more than men, but both sexes biasing their help more towards men than
women in their group (Figures 1b and 2b). In addition, we find that – while higher numbers of repro-
ductive women and men in a group depress relatedness and result in lower potentials for altruism –
differences in the numbers of female and male breeders (Nm ≠ Nf) do not result in sex differences in
potential for altruism (Amf/Amm and Aff/Afm are constants with respect to Nm and Nf; see Supporting
Information).
Moreover, we find that the effects of sex biases in dispersal and the scale of competition – the two
key modulators of altruism identified above – may reinforce each other or act in different directions,
influencing both who helps and who receives help. Where these two forces act in different directions,
who helps more and who receives more help may depend on the exact combination of demographic
parameter values (see Supporting Information). It is nonetheless possible to identify four broad pat-
terns of sex-specific altruism. If dispersal is strongly female-biased, men are more altruistic and also
receive more help than women, independently of sex differences in the scale of competition. The same
Figure 2. Male-to-male, male-to-female, female-to-male and female-to-female altruism. Each pie chart shows potential for altru-
ism by men towards male groupmates (dark blue) vs potential for altruism by men towards female groupmates (dark orange) vs
potential for altruism by women towards male groupmates (light blue) vs potential for altruism by women towards female group-
mates (light orange) and the sum of the four potentials (diameter of pie chart) – for low and high values of male and female
dispersal rates (a), or for low and high values of male and female scale of competition (b). Other parameter values: (a, b) Nm =
Nf = 3, a = 0.5, ω = 0.5; (a) σm = σf = 0.4 leading to Mm =Mf = 0.24 and αm = αf = 0.88; (b) mm =mf = 0.1, σi = 0.4 leading to Mi = 0.24
(for αi = 0.88) and σi = 0.2 leading to Mi = 0.16 (for αi = 0.96).
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configuration is obtained with a moderate male bias in dispersal and men competing more globally.
Societies with these demographies follow a ‘boys’ club’ or ‘men help men’ system, where altruism is
mostly by and for men. Conversely, if dispersal is strongly male-biased, women are more altruistic
and also receive more help than men, again independently of sex differences in the scale of competi-
tion. The same pattern is obtained with a moderate male bias in dispersal and women being the more
globally competing sex. Societies with these demographies follow a ‘girls’ club’ or ‘women help
women’ system, where altruism is mainly a female affair. In the other two configurations the sexes
of the predominant helper and helped differ. Women are more altruistic than men, but men receive
more altruism when dispersal is moderately male-biased or unbiased, and when men compete more
globally (‘women help men’ societies). Instead, men are more altruistic than women, but women
receive more altruism when dispersal is unbiased or moderately female-biased, and when women
compete more globally (‘men help women’ societies; see Figure 3).
Discussion
Recent years have seen great interest in the possible coevolution of between-group violence and
within-group altruism, but the potential for warfare – via its impact on demography – to influence
human social behaviours more widely and in sex-specific ways has been neglected. Here we performed
an inclusive fitness analysis to determine how selection acts on altruistic behaviours performed by men
and women – either for the benefit of all groupmates or targeted at males or females specifically – in
populations experiencing intergroup conflict. We found that warfare can promote within-group altru-
ism, even if this altruism does not improve the group’s performance in war. Furthermore, we found
that the degree of altruism may crucially depend upon the sex of the altruist and the recipient, and
upon two sex-specific demographic parameters: dispersal and the scale of competition.
Our analysis has revealed that warfare – through its effect on demography – can promote altruism,
broadly defined (Hamilton 1964; West et al. 2007). This is because, as a result of intergroup conflict,
individuals from victorious groups compete for reproductive opportunities with non-relatives in
defeated groups to some extent and, in this way, decrease harmful competition between kin that
would have otherwise inhibited the evolution of altruism. This result contributes to clarifying the
role of demography in promoting cooperation and altruism. In a much-celebrated paper, Taylor
(1992) showed that, in a population subdivided into groups with limited dispersal, altruism could
not spread, because the benefit obtained by helping groupmates was exactly cancelled by the kin
competition cost generated by these behaviours (see also Frank 1985, 1986a, b; Bulmer 1986 for an
earlier, analogous result for sex allocation). Subsequent work showed that a number of mechanisms
could lead to the decoupling of the effects of dispersal on relatedness and kin competition, allowing
for the evolution of altruism (reviewed in Lehmann and Rousset 2010). One such avenue involves indi-
viduals dispersing together with other groupmates, a mode of migration first discussed by Haldane
(1932) in his classic ‘tribe splitting’ model of altruism and now termed ‘budding dispersal’
(Gardner and West 2006; see also Goodnight 1992). In this way, members of a group can be compet-
ing for resources with non-relatives to some extent – reducing kin competition – while staying in close
proximity to their kin – maintaining high relatedness (Gardner and West 2006; Lehmann et al. 2006).
In Lehmann and Feldman’s (2008) model of warfare, intergroup conflict allows for the decoupling
of relatedness and competition: when a group is defeated in war, winning males compete for repro-
ductive opportunities with losers, thus maintaining relatedness at a high level while reducing kin com-
petition. This mechanism is distinct from budding dispersal as previously described – because
competition involves a mix of individuals from two different groups rather than occurring between
buds – but presents a strong analogy with it – as movement to other groups occurs in association
with groupmates rather than individually. Owing to this demographic effect of warfare, natural selec-
tion can favour men to express costly altruistic belligerence and bravery behaviours that increase the
group’s probability of engaging in and winning a war (Lehmann and Feldman 2008). Here, we showed
that this insight holds for all altruistic behaviours expressed by either men or women – not only those
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that directly impact on a group’s success in warfare and are expressed exclusively by men. In this
respect, our result also illuminates Haldane’s (1932) insight that within-group altruism could only
have evolved genetically in early human societies if groups were small and composed of related indi-
viduals – a combination that, he argued, could have only been achieved by human groups splitting
periodically. Our analysis suggests that warfare, with the movement of individuals to defeated groups
after victory, offers a mechanism for this splitting to occur. In this way, related individuals, who are
more likely to carry genes encoding a given altruistic behaviour, continue to be in close proximity to
each other generation after generation – and altruism has the possibility to spread.
Figure 3. Patterns of altruism as a
function of dispersal and the scale
of competition. Each pie chart shows
potential for altruism by men towards
male groupmates (dark blue) vs
potential for altruism by men towards
female groupmates (dark orange) vs
potential for altruism by women
towards male groupmates (light blue)
vs potential for altruism by women
towards female groupmates (light
orange) and the sum of the four poten-
tials (diameter of pie chart) – for differ-
ent combinations of male and female
dispersal rates and male and female
scale of competition coefficients. Other
parameter values: Nm =Nf = 3, a = 0.5,
ω = 0.5, σm = 0.4 and σf = 0.1 (‘men com-
pete more globally’, Mm = 0.24, Mf = 0.09,
αm = 0.94 and αf = 0.9775), σm = 0.1 and
σf = 0.4 (‘men compete more globally’,
Mm = 0.09, Mf = 0.24, αm = 0.9775 and
αf = 0.94), mm = 0.1 and mf = 0.8 (‘strong
female bias’), mm = 0.1 and mf = 0.2
(‘moderate female bias’), mm = 0.1 and
mf = 0.1 (‘no bias’), mm = 0.2 and mf =
0.1 (‘moderate male bias’), mm = 0.8
and mf = 0.1 (‘strong male bias’).
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Moreover, we showed that sex biases in two factors in the demography of warfare – dispersal and
the scale of competition – may drive sex-specific patterns of altruism. Firstly, we found that the sex
that disperses less is favoured both to be more altruistic and to receive more altruism. It is important
to underline that, following Lehmann and Feldman (2008) and Micheletti et al. (2017, 2018), we have
assumed that altruistic behaviours are performed after dispersal (the same assumption is made in
other studies investigating the dispersal–altruism interplay outside the context of warfare; e.g.
Johnstone and Cant 2008). This means that members of the more philopatric sex are more related
to their groupmates, but do not experience higher local competition. If, instead, altruistic behaviours
were performed before dispersal, then members of the less-dispersing sex would experience relatively
higher local competition – which could possibly outweigh the benefits of being altruistic towards
highly related groupmates. Our major qualitative results about sex-biases in altruism would still
hold in this case, although overall the benefits of altruism would need to be higher for the behaviour
to be selected.
Secondly, we revealed that sex differences in patterns of altruism can be driven by biases in the scale
of competition, that is the extent to which men and women from victorious groups compete with non-
relatives in defeated groups. Specifically, the sex that competes more locally is favoured to be more
altruistic, whereas the sex that competes more globally is favoured to receive more altruism, from
members of both sexes. For example, consider a scenario in which most men in a defeated group
are excluded from competing for reproduction by winning men, while both winning and defeated
women compete for marriage and resources in that group. In this case, warfare results in competition
being relatively more global for women than for men. Under these conditions, men are favoured to be
more altruistic than women, because they have more to gain by reducing kin competition within their
sex through altruism. At the same time, both sexes are favoured to behave more altruistically towards
women. This is because, although altruism can improve the competitiveness of both female and male
groupmates, the altruist’s male groupmates tend to compete for reproductive opportunities against
each other (such that one male relative’s gain is another male relative’s loss). On the other hand,
the altruist’s female groupmates are more likely to compete for reproductive opportunities against
unrelated individuals in other social groups. For this reason, the returns in terms of inclusive fitness
benefits are higher when helping the sex that competes more globally.
Our aim has been to capture how demography modulates sex-specific altruism in populations
experiencing warfare. To this end, we have focused on the roles of dispersal and the scale of compe-
tition, whilst assuming that both sexes are equally capable of helping, that is they experience the same
costs and provide the same benefits to their recipients. However, if the sexes did differ in the costs and
benefits of altruism, then this – fairly trivially – would be expected to drive sex differences in their
altruistic behaviour. For example, if one sex were less effective in helping – i.e. providing a lower bene-
fit – this would lead to a higher cost-to-benefit ratio and thus a lower level of altruism than for the
more effective sex. If instead the two sexes were equally effective in helping, but one incurred lower
costs associated with it, this would lead to a lower cost-to-benefit ratio and thus a higher level of altru-
ism than for the sex experiencing more substantial costs. In addition, we have not considered altruism
that is targeted at specific individuals on the basis of kin recognition, which is likely to be an important
modulator of human social behaviour. Incorporating kin recognition need not affect the overall level of
altruism enacted and received by each sex (GS Faria and A Gardner, ‘Does kin discrimination promote
cooperation?’, under review), but would enable investigation of individual-level variation in addition to
the between-sex and between-population variation that we have considered in the present analysis.
Furthermore, we found that the effects of sex biases in dispersal and competition can reinforce each
other or act in opposing directions, resulting in four broad patterns of sex-specific altruism which we
term ‘boys’ club’, ‘women help men’, ‘men help women’ and ‘girls’ club’ (summarised in Figure 3).
However, which of these patterns can we expect to find in current human populations? We suggest
that two different timescales can be potentially relevant, and we explore them in turn.
It might be that demographic asymmetries need to persist for very long times – on the order of
millions of years – to have an influence on patterns of sex-specific altruism. This would be the case
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if the traits under consideration were genetically inherited, or if we were considering genetic compo-
nents contributing to them. In this circumstance, the demographic patterns relevant for our study
would be those of ancestral human populations. Sex-biased dispersal in ancestral humans has been
greatly debated in recent years (see Box 1). If, as some argue (Ember 1975, 1978; Manson and
Wrangham 1991; Seielstad et al. 1998; Chapais 2008), female-biased dispersal was dominant early
in our evolutionary history and persisted rather uniformly until recently, then we would expect to
find the altruism patterns revealed by our model under this dispersal regime. For example, had this
migration pattern been accompanied by men competing more globally because of warfare, this
would have led to ‘boys’ club’ systems where men both helped more and received more help. If instead,
as others suggest (Marlowe 2004; Wilkins and Marlowe 2006; Hill et al. 2011; Sugiyama 2017), disper-
sal was unbiased in ancestral human populations, then – with respect to genetic components – we
would expect no sex differences in altruism.
On the other hand, it might be that more recent changes in patterns of dispersal – on the order of
centuries or millennia – can result in differences in sex-specific altruism between populations. This
would be the case if the altruistic traits under investigation were culturally inherited, or if we were con-
sidering culturally inherited contributors to such behaviours. Notice that, since our model identifies
men’s and women’s inclusive fitness interests, our qualitative predictions as to sex differences in altru-
istic behaviours would still be relevant if the traits under question were cultural variants selected on the
basis of their effects on the biological fitness of their carrier (‘type-1 cultural selection’, Birch 2017; see
also Mace 2014). Therefore, in such a case, we would expect societies with different post-marital resi-
dence rules – cultural norms mediating dispersal in humans that can change relatively rapidly (Jordan
Box 1. Sex-specific dispersal in ancestral humans
Recent years have witnessed a heated debate surrounding patterns of sex biased dispersal in ancestral
human populations, living a hunter-gatherer lifestyle in the Pleistocene (Marlowe, 2004; Wilkins and
Marlowe, 2006; Sugiyama, 2017). Here, we summarise the current state of the evidence.
Firstly, extant great apes – chimpanzees and bonobos, our closest living relatives, and gorillas – are all
characterised by female-biased dispersal (Lawson Handley and Perrin 2007), which has led some to argue
that ancestral humans too are likely to have followed this pattern (e.g. Manson and Wrangham 1991;
Chapais 2008; but see Sugiyama 2017). Secondly, population genetics studies have examined variation in
mitochondrial DNA (maternally inherited) and the non-recombining region of the Y-chromosome
(paternally inherited), offering contrasting dispersal estimates. In two global comparisons, Seielstad et al.
(1998) found evidence of higher female dispersal, but Wilder et al. (2004) found no such bias. Wilkins and
Marlowe (2006) argue that these results stem from differences in the sampling scheme adopted, with the
study finding unbiased dispersal being more reflective of pre-agricultural societies and the study finding a
female bias capturing residential patterns that emerged after the spread of agriculture. Thirdly, dispersal
in extant hunter-gatherers can be informative as these societies are considered the best available models
for pre-agricultural populations (Marlowe, 2005). Hunter-gatherer societies have long been characterised
as mostly patrilocal (i.e. women moving to the husband’s group; Ember 1975, 1978; Foley 1995). However,
recent work has shown that hunter-gatherers move frequently between bands and spouses can move to
either the husband’s or the wife’s band: a system best described as ‘multilocal’ or ‘bilocal’ (Marlowe 2004;
Hill et al. 2011). However, this does not mean that dispersal is necessarily unbiased. For example, in a
study of 32 extant hunter-gather societies, Hill et al. (2011) found more co-residing brothers than sisters in
17 societies, the opposite pattern in three societies, and no bias in the remaining 12.
Overall, notwithstanding the great developments in these three research avenues, it is still unclear
what pattern of dispersal was followed by our Pleistocene ancestors. It is possible that dispersal was on
average female-biased throughout our history, becoming more pronounced with the advent of
agriculture. Alternatively, it may have been unbiased during the Pleistocene and became female-biased
after the agricultural revolution, in association with patrilocal residence rules.
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et al. 2009; Opie et al. 2014; Ji et al. 2016) – to show the patterns predicted by our model for the
corresponding sex biases in dispersal.
In any of these two cases, empirical studies investigating sex differences in cooperation could offer
some support for the results of our study. The potential for such differences has been studied exten-
sively employing economic games in the laboratory, with contrasting results: one metanalysis revealed
that interactions between men are more cooperative than interactions between women (Balliet et al.
2011), whereas another found that women are more cooperative than men (Engel 2011). However,
these studies – performed almost exclusively with WEIRD (western, educated, industrialised, rich,
and democratic; Henrich et al. 2010) participants – do not consider ecological variables and thus
cannot illuminate the role of demographic effects on altruism. Instead, our predictions are best tested
in the field, specifically in small-scale societies that vary in dispersal patterns and that currently engage
in – or have a recent history of – intergroup conflict.
Two studies investigating cooperation in agro-pastoral societies in South-Western China with eco-
nomic games (Gong et al. 2015; Wu et al. 2015) might offer some support for the demographic effects
identified in our model. These societies – Pumi, Han, Yi, Amdo, Khampa, Mosuo and Zhaba – share
similar ecologies while differing substantially in post-marital residence rules, the cultural norms regu-
lating dispersal in human societies (Jordan et al. 2009). In addition, blood feuds and cattle raiding are
now very much limited by state policing but were common in most of these groups until recently (Cai
2001; Yeh 2003; Pirie 2005; Harrell 2011; Shi 2018) and it is reasonable that they might still influence
cultural norms and actual behaviour. Wu et al. (2015) showed that men are more cooperative and/or
altruistic than women in both duolocal (neither sex migrates, unbiased dispersal) and patrilocal
(female-biased dispersal) populations. At the same time, they found lower levels of cooperation
when more men than women participate in the games (Wu et al. 2015), which might indicate that
both sexes are more incentivised to be altruistic towards women than towards men. Our results suggest
that this pattern might have been driven by warfare: men being more altruistic and women receiving
more altruism is the outcome we obtain under unbiased or moderately female-biased dispersal – as
observed in these societies – and with women competing more globally than men as a result of
war (‘men help women’, see Figure 3). To our knowledge, patterns of post-war competition in defeated
groups are unknown for these societies, but could be possibly inferred from oral reports and historical
documents regarding intergroup conflict (an example of how greater female competition might be rea-
lised as a result of war is discussed above).
Moreover, Gong et al. (2015) found that duolocal Mosuo men give more than women in the
Dictator game, and they also give more than patrilocal Yi men. Given that these societies show
unbiased or moderately female-biased dispersal, these results might again be in line with our ‘men
help women’ configuration (Figure 3), but the study does not test for the effect of receiver’s sex.
Furthermore, the finding that altruistic giving is lower in patrilocal populations (Gong et al. 2015),
might result from higher dispersal rates in these groups leading to lower relatedness – as predicted
by our model. Interestingly, Wu et al. (2015) found the opposite pattern: higher dispersal societies
show more altruism. Additional work, both theoretical and empirical, is clearly needed to disentangle
the effects of dispersal on relatedness and kin competition and determine how the two might interact
to influence social behaviours in human populations. Elucidating demographic factors – and
the within-group or between-group processes influencing it, including warfare – promises to be a
fruitful avenue.
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